What Would Zarqawi Do?

While I'm greatly bemused by Kos's hinted-at circular firing squad plan for the Democratic Party, I am far from content with the way conservatives are limp-wristing the War in Iraq right now.

A very vocal anti-American and pacifistic minority in the political far, far left believes passionately that we should withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq immediately, literally believing that one more American death in this war is a wasted American life. A somewhat larger group believes that we should set a fixed withdrawal date and pull all of our forces out by a pre-determined time. Another large group of Americans feels that we should pull out once some pre-determined conditions have been met.

These three positions are the only positions that matter in the current political environment, though these three positions are far from equal.

"Not One More"
The most radical of the anti-war protestors want the United States to remove all American military forces in an immediate and haphazard retreat. Their stated goal is to save American lives, because "not one more" soldier or Marine should die in Iraq. Some of the fringe elements, such as Cindy Sheehan, even advocate a full withdrawal from Afghanistan as well.

But what could happen if these protestors got their wish for an unconditional withdrawal?

Frankly, no one knows for certain.

While the insurgency has been regularly hyped by the media and are capable of occasionally spectacular attacks, the insurgent movement in Iraq is already close to collapse, as intercepted letters from terrorist leader Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi and terrorist lieutenant Abu Zayd have indicated. A weakened terrorist group with foreign leadership should not be able to win domestically in Iraq against an Iraq military and police force that is increasingly capable of handling it's own affairs. On a straight head to head match-up between Iraqi government and terrorist forces, it is probable that the Iraqi people would destroy the terrorists in their midst, provided they had a chance to get their government established first.

We are currently still in the process of establishing Iraqi military and police forces. On the plus side, there are no shortage of recruits. On the down side, recruits aren't quite where we would have hoped at this point. We need time to train them, and time to withdraw gradually to let them get established and confident before we leave completely.

If Cindy Sheehan and her compatriots in the "not one more" movement got their wish for a headlong retreat, the ensuing chaos as unprepared civilian authorities fought insurgents and criminals in a power vacuum, would cost thousands of innocent civilian lives before Iraqi authorities would be able to restore civil order. This is in one of the better scenarios.

Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi, of course, would have his own plans.

In a worst-case scenario, sectarian tensions exacerbated by Zaraqawi's terrorists or militias like Muqtada al Sadr's could rip the country apart into tribal and ethnic warfare on par with the genocidal slaughters of Bosnia or Rwanda. At this point, the United States would be forced to reinvade Iraq again to tear the warring parties apart, or allow tens of thousands (perhaps more) to die in a civil war.

In the rush to recklessly disengage, the far left would leave millions at risk, just as they led 2 million Cambodians to die in the killing fields after the end of the Vietnam war because of our headlong retreat from Southeast Asia. While Cindy Sheehan and her allies cannot see it, their tactics would result in the most deaths of the three major disengagement strategies.

I doubt this is the legacy the "peace" movement really wants to leave. Perhaps they are just too ignorant to understand their actions.

"Establish a Timetable"
A popular option among most moderate Americans, and one than spans party lines, is the idea of establishing a fixed timetable for withdrawal and strictly sticking to it.

This strategy is not without its merits.

It allows for an orderly withdrawal of United States forces, it proves to the Iraqi people that we are not imperialists as some fear, and it forces Iraqi government and its security forces to try to be prepared for the handover of security duties as the United States withdraws.

There is only one real downside to this disengagement strategy, and that is that a fixed timetable encourages terrorists to simply hold their operations while building stockpiles so that they can mount a massive offensive once we've left.

The hope of this strategy from the terrorist's perspective is that they can simply outwait the American forces that are their greatest threat, and as soon as we've withdrawn, they could launch a "Desert Tet" in an attempt to ignite the same chaos and sectarian violence mentioned previously. The biggest downside is that knowing they can outwait America, they have time to marshal their forces, and rebuild their supply lines. This strategy is less likely to succeed for Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi in the long term than an immediate pullout, but it cold still cause unnecessary mass civilian casualties. The insurgency may have a chance to go out in a devastating blaze of glory, killing thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians. I think most Americans would refer to avoid this option if possible.

"When the Time is Right"
The third option is establish a clear set of criteria for what we consider an acceptable set of conditions, and start a phased withdrawal when those conditions are met. It is not important that the public knows exactly what these conditions are; in fact by making these conditions known, it negates them by creating the same scenario above. The terrorists might simply try placate us, artificially creating conditions so that so that we will leave while they regroup.

But it is important that we have these conditions, and that the public knows we have conditions, and that we withdraw when these conditions are met, and no sooner.

In all likelihood, the Bush administration has these conditions set, but it has failed to articulate this fact to the general public. The administration must impress upon the public the importance of completing the mission, wile keeping up the pressure upon the insurgency so that when the Iraqi government transitions into the lead security role, it faces a battered insurgency it can finish off on its own terms, rather than a rested and waiting insurgency able to pose a real threat to the future of Iraq.