al Qaeda Letter Apparently Disputes NIE

A letter (PDF) found in the rubble of the safehouse in which al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed seems to dispute some of the dire conclusions reached in the leaked excerpts of the National Intelligence Estimate as published by the New York Times and Washington Post last week.

The captured letter sheds new light on the friction between al-Qa`ida's senior leadership and al-Qa`ida's commanders in Iraq over the appropriate use of violence. The identity of the letter's author, “`Atiyah,” is unknown, but based on the contents of the letter he seems to be a highly placed al-Qa`ida leader who fought in Algeria in the early 1990s. `Atiyah's letter echoes many of the themes found in the October 2005 letter written to Zarqawi by al-Qa`ida's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri; indeed, it goes so far as to explicitly confirm the authenticity of that earlier letter. `Atiyah's admonitions in this letter, like those of Zawahiri in his letter to Zarqawi, also dovetail with other publicly available texts by al-Qa`ida strategists.

Although `Atiyah praises Zarqawi's military success against coalition forces in Iraq, he is most concerned with Zarqawi's failure to understand al-Qa`ida's broader strategic objective: attracting mass support among the wider Sunni Muslim community. `Atiyah reminds Zarqawi that military actions must be subservient to al-Qa`ida's long-term political goals. Zarqawi's use of violence against popular Sunni leaders, according to `Atiyah, is undermining al-Qa`ida's ability to win the “hearts of the people.” 2

According to `Atiyah, Zarqawi's widening scope of operations, culminating with the November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, has alienated fellow Sunnis and reduced support for the global al-Qa`ida movement. In this vein, `Atiyah instructs Zarqawi to avoid killing popular Iraqi Sunni leaders because such actions alienate the very populations that al-Qa`ida seeks to attract to its cause.3 `Atiyah also encourages Zarqawi to forge strategic relationships with moderate Sunnis, particularly tribal and religious leaders, even if these leaders do not accept Zarqawi's religious positions.

`Atiyah instructs Zarqawi to follow orders from Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on major strategic issues, such as initiating a war against Shiites; undertaking large-scale operations; or operating outside of Iraq. `Atiyah goes on to criticize Zarqawi's board of advisors in Iraq for their lack of adequate political and religious expertise, and he warns Zarqawi against the sin of arrogance. Because al-Qa`ida is in what `Atiyah calls a “stage of weakness,” `Atiyah urges Zarqawi to seek counsel from wiser men in Iraq— implying that there might be someone more qualified than Zarqawi to command al-Qa`ida operations in Iraq.

`Atiyah closes with a request that Zarqawi send a messenger to “Waziristan” (likely, Waziristan, Pakistan) in order to establish a reliable line of communication with Bin Laden and Zawahiri. `Atiyah confirms in the letter that al-Qa`ida's overall communications network has been severely disrupted and complains specifically that sending communications to Zarqawi from outside of Iraq remains difficult. Interestingly, he explains how Zarqawi might use jihadi discussion forums to communicate with al-Qa`ida leadership in Waziristan.

According to this captured document:

• Zarqawi had failed to understand and execute al Qaeda's broader strategic objectives, and instead had alienated fellow Sunnis from al Qaeda, reducing their support of the terror organization.
• Zarqawi group did not have "adequate political and religious expertise" and was "in a stage of weakness."
• al Qaeda's communications lines have been severely disrupted.

The al Qaeda letter shows a terrorist group that does not seem to feel it is winning. This seems to be very much in contrast to the version of events as published in the Post's article, where it is claimed that "the situation in Iraq has worsened the U.S. position."

Note that the Post article does not seem to cast a critical eye toward this NIE, even though in the same article, it points out that all of the conclusion in the 2002 NIE "turned out to be false."

I suppose it is possible that both al Qaeda and the United States could be facing concurrent setbacks, but it appears to me that our leader isn't hiding in a mountain cave, nor in any immediate threat of being killed by a missile-equipped drone high overhead.

If I am to believe either document, I think the captured al Qaeda document shows the true situation on the ground far more accurately, as bad as that may be for the media and Democratic Party view.