May 16, 2007
An Accidental Interview
I had an interesting twenty-minute face-to-face conversation with a Spec Ops soldier named "K.C." last night.
K.C. first jumped into Iraq on March 26, 2003 with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, in the largest combat air drop since WWII. He most recently served in a six-man Long Range Surveillance (LRS) unit. The LRS are direct descendents of the famed LRRP "A-teams" of the Vietnam War era.
He was careful not to mention assignments or duty locations, but based upon some of the things he stated in our conversation, I gather that he has served extensively in Iraq, and perhaps in Afghanistan as well. He is presently on leave.
During the course of our conversation, K.C. told me the same things I've heard time and again from soldiers at nearby Fort Bragg, airmen from Pope AFB, and the occasion Marines from Camp Lejune and MCAS Cherry Point.
Stop me if you've heard these before.
"The war you see in the media is not the war we are fighting."
If he has his way, K.C. would boot all media out of Iraq. Like others soldiers and Marines before him, he noted to problem of news organizations basing many of their stories based upon anecdotal conversations from locals with their own agendas, while ignoring the testimony of U.S. soldiers, or sometimes cherry-picking comments and dowdifying them to the point that they no longer reflected what the soldier actually said, reflected the battles they've fought, or the experiences they've had. Reporters have alsoeither ignored the physical evidence supporting soldiers contentions, or have been too ignorant or biased to assimilate the information.
K.C.'s observation reminds me of a conversation I had with a soldier who fought in Ramadi some months ago, who spoke of an attack in his area that left civilians dead. The media blamed the deaths on a firefight involving U.S. forces, even though it was 7.62x39mm shell casings (the cartridge used almost universally by Arab militaries, militias, and insurgent groups) and expended RPG fragments found at the scene of the attack, and no signs of American involvement were present.
K.C. related one particular story that obviously still bothered him, that of a school hit by insurgents during the early days of the war. The insurgents killed a number of children, and the media accounts he later saw attributed it to a U.S. airstrike.
I guess that even though the AP has stopped using his name since he was exposed as a fraud, Jamil Not-Hussein still really gets around.
I told him about milblogs, maintained by the active duty soldiers and veterans, and how I thought that if the military was smart, they'd make an effort to channel more information through them to bypass the media that he and other soldiers distrust so much, enabling soldiers to directly tell their stories and experiences to the world. He liked the concept quite a bit, even though he stated he couldn't write about what he personally did.
I hope any military brass that happen to be reading this listens.
"G--D--- Democrats"
Like every single soldier, airman and Marine I've talked to, K.C. is disgusted with Democrat politicians. He pulls no punches: he considers them supporters of terrorism. Period.
This is a sentiment I've also heard before, and interestingly enough, it seems, at least among those I've talked with, that the infantry soldiers and Marines who have spent the most time on the ground feel this the strongest.
Of course, this could have several reasons. The frontline soldiers have more personally invested blood, sweat and tears in the war, have lost friends, and have killed men in Iraq. They also interact with the Iraqi people, and would presumably know them and the culture better than support troops or the airmen I've spoken with. Some seemed to like the Iraqi people, some did not, but to a man, they all wanted to continue the mission and were visibly, coldly (and sometimes not so coldly) angry with Democratic attempts to lose the war.
I shook hands with K.C., wished him well, and told him to keep his head down as he prepares for his next deployment in Our Children's Children's War.
Good luck and Godspeed to that brave soldier.
Posted by: Dan Irving at May 16, 2007 10:02 AMTrackbacked by The Thunder Run - Web Reconnaissance for 05/16/2007
A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention.
"[T]hey all wanted to continue the mission and were visibly, coldly (and sometimes not so coldly) angry with Democratic attempts to lose the war."
How impressed are they with Republican attempts to win the war? Both look equally halfhearted.
Posted by: Shochu John at May 16, 2007 10:42 AMAt least the Republicans are attempting to win. Alot better than attempting to lose.
Posted by: Justin at May 16, 2007 11:39 AMReally, Justin? Here's how I see it. There are only two responsible things to do in a war: win it or get the hell out. Winning it is better than getting out and both are better than jabbering on about winning while having no actual strategy to do so.
Is there a plan to avoid a bloody Iraqi civil war? If so, what is it, if not, what do we accomplish by delaying it?
Posted by: Shochu John at May 16, 2007 12:30 PM"no actual strategy?"
Here's 252 pages of "no actual strategy" (PDF). You won't actually read any of it, of course.
Its successful implementation will slowly begin to eat away at the bloody sectarian divide, which arose out of security concerns to begin with. If the security concerns are addressed, JAM has no reason to exist, and will stop going after Sunnis (not that they have done a lot of that recently anyway). These security concerns, often the result of Sunni and al Qaeda attacks against Shias, are already being impacted by the "awakening" movements in Anbar and Diyala, where Sunni tribes are joining the police and military, while turning on their former Sunni insurgent and al Qaeda allies.
You now have "the plan" if you actually are willing to read it.
Somehow, I doubt you'll get much past the cover page.
Posted by: Confederate Yankee at May 16, 2007 12:47 PMGetting the hell out is a "responsable" part of war? Wow.
Posted by: Justin at May 16, 2007 02:30 PMA few minor points... The March 03 drop was the largest combat airdrop since Panama in '89. Although the same USAF page also describes it as the largest _formation_ airdop since D-Day, confusingly. Also, LRRPs had nothing to do with "A" teams. LRRPs were recon, trained by SF, but largely manned by Rangers, until being handed completely over to the Rangers in '69. "A" teams are multi-purpose units mainly for deep infiltration and sabotage, either on their own or by making contact with friendly nationals in-country.
Also,
The media blamed the deaths on a firefight involving U.S. forces, even though it was 7.62x39mm shell casings (the cartridge used almost universally by Arab militaries, militias, and insurgent groups) and expended RPG fragments found at the scene of the attack, and no signs of American involvement were present.
BS. Anyone who's even been in that part of the world knows how incredibly common AKs are, and I happen to know that no small number of US personnel have access to and even carry AKs themselves. Saying it was 7.62 casings proves nothing either way.
And as for yor "actual strategy"? Allow me to quote for you paragraph 6 of Joint Pub 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning":
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U) Paragraph: 6 The Scope of Joint Operation Planning
a. Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.
(1) Mobilization. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Mobilization may include activating all or part of the Reserve_ Component. Mobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders.
Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, discusses joint mobilization planning in greater detail.
(2) Deployment. Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement of forces and their requisite sustaining resources within the United States, within theaters, and between theaters. Deployment is primarily the responsibility of the supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs) and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.
(3) Employment. Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area (OA). Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning. Employment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate and supporting commanders.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, this publication, and numerous other publications in the joint doctrine system discuss joint employment planning in greater detail.
(4) Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the joint force commander (JFC) with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; allowing the JFC to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commander (CCDR)s and their Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.
Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, and other joint logistic doctrine publications discuss joint sustainment planning in greater detail.
(5) Redeployment. Redeployment encompasses the movement of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status. Redeployment is primarily the responsibility of supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs) and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, discusses joint redeployment planning in greater detail.
(6) Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It includes the return of Reserve_ Component units, individuals, and materiel stocks to their former status. Demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders.
Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, discusses demobilization planning in greater detail.
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I could sift through Google, but I have seen numerous qutes and stories where senior members of the military, including then-Vice Chairman Pace, flatly state that they did not perform steps 5 and 6 at all for OIF. And it's pretty obvious that step 4 wasn't fully worked out either. What it boils down to is that regardless of what is said or written, Bush is only capable of thinking in terms of 'hit it with a bigger hammer', which only guarrantees that more people like KC will come back in body bags, and that "victory", regardless of how you define it, in not going to happen.
Posted by: legion at May 16, 2007 03:42 PMUm, Yankee, that's an army field manual. A doncument describing a doctrine. Not a strategy. Not even a tactic. Did you actually read it?
And in the preface it makes two very important points: An organization that is geared toward winning large scale conventional warfare is exactly the wrong one for fighting an insurgency. And a unit must begin preparing to fight a specific insurgency operation months or years in advance.
This would have been a great document to have had around the whitehouse in, oh, say 2001. Pity it wan't even written until last year.
It's to late now. We do not have the man power for the operation and even if we got a draft today it'd be 2 years before we could field the additional 350-500K ground troops Patreaus needs to do the job. According to chapter 4 you need a 40 to one ratio of combat troops to civilians on the ground to have an optimal chance of success and they all need to be "culturally aware". There's 25 million Iraqi civilians. That means you need 625K ground troops who have been trained to understand the culture and at least one per platoon who speaks the local language. We just don't have that and we're not going to get it.
Right now the nasteist thing we could do to Al Qaida in Iraq is to get out and leave that Sunni terrorist cult to the mercy of the Shiite majority.
"You now have "the plan" if you actually are willing to read it."
That's not a plan, that's a counterinsurgency manual. Don't get me wrong, I'm glad we have a counterinsurgency manual, it's just not a plan. As our Iraqi allies have proven themselves decidedly unhelpful for four years running, we're going to have to do this ourselves. To do counterisnurgency properly, we need 400-500K more troops minimal. If you doubt this, perhaps you should read you manual again and consider the manpower it will take to secure the entire country simultaenously, instead of our crruent strategy which involves clearing the same area over and over again because we simply don't have the people to hold it. As we are never going to send enough troops, our sole other alternative is to apply blunt force and rule by fear. It worked for Saddam, but we're not that kind of country, are we?
As I have said before, a part of me almost hopes that the Democrats show their classic spinelessness and fail to get the troops out of Iraq, that Bush and his people get their way from start to finish. That way, there is nobody else to blame when this inadequate "surge" fails. However, what kind of person would I be if I were to advocate the continuation of a war that I knew was pointless just to be proven right? Alas, I fear the only moral thing to do is advocate for withdrawal.
Posted by: Shochu John at May 16, 2007 06:01 PMBoth look equally halfhearted.
Yea, but on the spectrum between surrender and victory, the democrats generally stake out the ground on the surrender side and the republicans the generally stake out the ground on the victory side.
Posted by: Purple Avenger at May 16, 2007 08:13 PMHaving served with 173rd in Vietnam under both Johnson and Nixon, I can tell it does not matter who talks the toughest. There ain't no big shot Republicans son serving in combat. Opening a second front in Iraq was one of the greatest military blunders in history. Blaming the Media and people who are against the war is just a smokescreen for cowards who wouldn't serve if Bin laden was making a landing on the Maine coast. The 173rd is on it's way back to Afghanistan for it's second tour in June,to fight a reborn Taliban that was never destroyed in 2001.Had we done the job then instead of rushing off to Iraq many lives could have been spared. And make no mistake about it the thinking men and women in Iraq know this thing is over , the countdown has begun their just hoping to avoid being the last one clipped. To you fools that have been hoodwinked by Bush and Cheney's tough talk as they get ready to walk off to the the rich man's sunset .shame shame shame. It is not the Media who has the blood on their hands.
Posted by: bob at May 17, 2007 04:17 AM
