Ahmadinejad Claims Iran's Nuclear Drive Can't be Stopped

Nuclear chicken, anyone?

Iran's nuclear program cannot be stopped, and any Western attempt to force a halt to uranium enrichment would be like playing "with the lion's tail," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Tuesday.

In Berlin, Germany's foreign minister reported no progress in talks with Iran's chief nuclear negotiator ahead of the Group of Eight summit. And with the U.N. Security Council preparing to debate a third set of sanctions for Tehran's refusal to suspend enrichment, Britain raised the possibility of adding curbs on oil and gas investment to the limited measures against individuals and companies involved in Iran's nuclear and weapons programs.

"We advise them to give up stubbornness and childish games," Ahmadinejad said at a news conference. "Some say Iran is like a lion. It's seated quietly in a corner. We advise them not to play with the lion's tail."

Added Ahmadinejad: "It is too late to stop the progress of Iran."

In Washington, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack responded: "It isn't."

McCormack is of course referring to diplomatic efforts by the United States and other nations in the international community to coax Iran into giving up their suspected nuclear weapons program.

Like any nuclear weapons program, the Iranian nuclear weapons program must have multiple minimum components, those being the ability to acquire raw uranium ore, the ability and facilities to process and enrich the uranium to "weapons grade," the ability to develop a warhead, and the ability to deliver a warhead.

Iran has as many as 10 functioning uranium mines according to GlobalSecurity.Org, so acquiring the raw uranium ore has never been an issue. Iran also has at least 11 known facilities to process and enrich their raw ores, with Natanz and Bushehr perhaps being the most well known. Iran is also developing a parallel plutonium-based program out of Arak.

As for the warheads, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency (IAEA) stated that they were aware that Iran has acquired documents and drawings on the black market, and there has been speculation that Iran may have acquired dual-use components from western countries in the 1990s, as well as warhead technology from North Korea.

Iran is said to have developed long-range missiles such as the claimed Fajr-3 with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability typically used only with nuclear warheads, and the proven Shahab-3, which can carry a singe conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead.

Based upon this information, it seems Iran has the technical capability to build a viable nuclear weapons threat. Based upon the continued threats and rhetoric issued from Iran through President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran also has the political will and strategic goal of becoming a nuclear power.

Western nations that feel threatened by Iran's apparent drive for nuclear weapons essentially have three options:

• Let Iran continue to develop their nuclear program and hope they are not developing a nuclear weapons program as well;
• Attempt to convince Iran not to develop a nuclear through political and economic pressures and incentives;
• Take covert and overt intelligence and military operations to undermine or remove Iran's nuclear capabilities.

We are well past the point where any reasonable nation can assume that Iran is not attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program. They have been caught with warhead plans by U.N. inspectors, and have developed nuclear-capable delivery systems.

The present efforts are primarily diplomatic and economic in nature, hoping to force Iran to the bargaining table, but as Ahmadinejad's most recent threats and rhetoric attest, they have no intention of slowing nuclear development. If they cannot be persuaded to stop their nuclear program through peaceable means, that leaves only the use of intelligence and military forces.

There has been some speculation and a few indications that covert efforts are already underway, some mirroring efforts used against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, such as providing flawed plans through double agents and spies, and at least one top Iranian nuclear scientist has died within the past year.

These covert efforts, however, can at best slow the Iranian nuclear program. There is no way to be sure that any compromised systems will go undiscovered and uncorrected, and the accumulated knowledge is difficult to eradicate with the death of a few occasional scientists, even if they are prominent.

Sadly, with continued defiance by Iran's government and their apparent belief that nuclear capability is in their nation's best interests, a military solution may yet prove that Iran's nuclear drive can indeed be stopped through force of arms.

The IAF Air Force has 25 F-15I "Ra'am" and 102 F-16I "Sufa" long-range strike fighters with the capability of hitting hardened targets with "bunker-buster" bombs in Iran without refueling. If they can arrange in-air refueling, there are no potential targets in Iran out of range.

There seems to be a common misconception that our ground combat in Iraq precludes a strike on Iran if one is warranted, but that supposition has no basis at all in reality. The U.S. assets available for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities are literally too numerous to name. While the U.S. military's ground forces are heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Air Force and Naval units are virtually free for involvement.

At least three U.S. carrier strike groups carrying more than 240 aircraft are thought to be within range of Iran, and an unknown number of submarine and surface fleet vessels armed with cruise missiles are within range of Iran or can be relatively stealthily deployed to the region.

With mid-air refueling capabilities, the U.S. Air Force fleet of B-1B, B-2, and B-52 bombers and the U.S. strike fighter fleet of F15s, F-16s, and F-117 and F-22 stealth fighters can bring to bear literally thousands of precision-guided bombs if needed in single or multiple sorties.

Should it be determined that the military strike is warranted, precedent indicates that President Bush does not need Congressional approval for such a strike. All U.S. Presidents of the past three decades (yes, even Jimmy Carter) have launched military operations without needing or seeking congressional approval, from Carter's botched attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran, to Reagan's strikes on Libya and Grenada, to Bush 41's invasion of Panama, and Clinton's strikes on Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Sudan.

There is some debate over whether such air strikes by U.S. and Israeli aircraft could destroy or significantly damage Iran's nuclear capability. Even with the recent purchase of Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems, Iran's anti-aircraft capability is second-rate, their aging and obsolete Air Force would probably never get off the ground, so their ability to successfully oppose such a strike through is very unlikely.

I would posit that both the Israeli and the U.S. military have munitions capable of destroying or severely damaging Iranian nuclear sites (even hardened underground bunkers), if those sites can be accurately identified. The attacks would only be likely to fail if the targets cannot accurately be identified and targeted.

The obvious downside of any attack by Israel or the United States upon Iranian nuclear facilities is the very real possibility, if not probability, of an Iranian counterattack by both conventional and unconventional forces.

Iran would certainly target U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf in the wake of any attack on Iran, and may also possibly target civilian shipping as well. Some experts anticipate that Iran may also attempt to invade southern Iraq in retaliation. If such an attack takes place, out-gunned and out-manned British forces are severely under threat, and there is a distinct possibility that units could be overrun before coalition airpower annihilated Iranian conventional forces. Iran may also fire missiles at U.S. bases and Iraqi cities. Shia militias loyal to Iran would be directed to rise up against U.S. forces in Iraq, and the resulting battles would potentially be very bloody. Several dozen to several hundred U.S. soldiers could become fatalities, and no doubt thousands of Shia militiamen and civilians would probably perish on the other side.

Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups would probably fire barrages of rockets into Israeli civilian populations, and there is some concern--I'm not sure how serious to take these--that Syria would attack and attempt to retake the Goal Heights, with the predictable disastrous results to Syrian forces.

There is also a credible threat of Hezbollah-directed terrorist attacks again U.S. interests worldwide and possibly in the United States as a result.

Make no mistake: Iran has the capability to hit back in retaliation after their nuclear facilities are struck, and depending on how these attacks are executed in Iraq, Israel, the united States and elsewhere, casualties could be significant.

What the U.S government, the Israeli's, and perhaps other western and Middle Eastern powers have to take into account is whether or not the threatened Iranian retaliation is a greater threat that the Iranian nuclear program. If Iran is allowed to develop nuclear weapons and their continuous threats are sincere and not just rhetoric, then quite literally, millions of lives are at risk. The result of attempting to use military force to destroy Iran's nuclear program could result in the deaths of thousands. While both options could be avoided by an internal revolt in Iran or a sudden change of course by their government, I fear this bloody drama will be played out by January of 2008, one way, or the other.